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The securitization of subprime mortgage loans is widely viewed as a root cause of the 
financial crisis. This lecture balances the costs and benefits of securitization, focusing on 
what went wrong and on what needs to be fixed to curtail securitization’s abuses and 
make it viable again as an important financing tool. Finally, the lecture examines 
alternatives to securitization, focusing on covered bonds and comparing and contrasting 
covered bonds and securitization. 
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PART I 
SECURITIZATION’S ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
The securitization of subprime mortgage loans is widely viewed as a 
root cause of the financial crisis. In the United States, there was significant 
government pressure on banks and other lenders to make home-mortgage 
loans to expand home ownership, even for risky borrowers. These subprime 
loans were often made, for example, to borrowers with little de facto 
income, anticipating that home-value appreciation would enable the 
borrowers to refinance to lower-rate mortgages. Historically, home prices 
had generally been increasing in the United States since the Great 
Depression. 
 
But this model failed when, in 2007 and 2008, home prices fell 
significantly. In one sense, the precipitous drop in home prices was 
unexpected—like Monty’s Python’s skit, “Nobody expects the Spanish 
Inquisition.” In another sense, though, the fall arguably should have been 
anticipated based on the earlier liquidity glut and its artificially low interest 
rates, driving up housing prices artificially. 
 
As a result of the fall in home prices, borrowers who were relying on 
refinancing for loan repayment could not refinance. Furthermore, many 
subprime mortgage loans had adjustable rates which increased after an initial 
“teaser” period. Borrowers who could not afford the rate increases had 
expected to refinance at lower interest rates. That likewise was stymied by 
collapsing home prices. For these reasons, many risky borrowers began 
defaulting.  
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 These defaults in turn caused substantial amounts of low-investment-
grade-rated mortgage-backed securities to default and the highest (“AAA”) 
rated securities to be downgraded. That, in turn, spooked investors who 
believed that “AAA” meant iron-clad safety and that “investment grade” 
meant relative freedom from default. Investors started losing confidence in 
ratings and avoiding all types of rated debt securities. 
  
Fewer investors meant that the price of debt securities began falling. 
Falling prices meant that firms using debt securities as collateral had to mark 
them to market and put up cash, requiring the sale of more securities, which 
caused market prices to plummet further downward in a death spiral. The 
refusal in mid-September 2008 of the U.S. government to save Lehman 
Brothers, and its resulting bankruptcy, added to this cascade. Investors lost 
all confidence in debt markets, and even the short-term commercial paper 
market virtually shut down.  
 
The lack of debt financing meant that companies could no longer 
grow and, in some cases, even survive. That affected the real economy and 
led to the financial crisis.  
 
PART II 
ADDRESSING SECURITIZATION’S PROBLEMS 
 
 Because of its role in initially triggering the financial crisis, 
securitization has been villainized. But prior to the crisis, and even now, 
securitization is one of the primary mechanisms by which companies can 
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obtain financing from the capital markets, bypassing high-cost 
intermediaries such as banks—an approach known as “disintermediation.” 
 
 As a tool for disintermediation, securitization can more precisely 
allocate risk with capital, avoiding middleman inefficiencies. It also can 
enable companies to access capital markets directly, in most cases at lower 
cost than the cost of issuing direct debt (such as bonds or commercial paper). 
Moreover, when the securitized assets are loans (such as mortgage loans), 
securitization can help to transform the loans into cash from which banks 
and other lenders can make new loans. [Indeed, the function of the quasi-
governmental firms, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S. (discussed 
yesterday during the Q&A period), has been to ensure this transformation 
process occurs.] 
 
 These positives might be outweighed, however, by securitization’s 
flaws revealed by the recent financial crisis. Whether securitization, even 
with the flaws, created net positive value is an unresolved question. My goal 
in this talk is not to attempt to answer that question. I merely examine how 
to overcome these flaws.    
 
 There are at least four potential flaws: subprime mortgages may be a 
problematic asset type that should not have been securitized; the originate-
to-distribute model of securitization might create moral hazard; 
securitization can create servicing conflicts; and securitization can foster 
overreliance on mathematical models.  
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The financial crisis also revealed a possible fifth flaw: that investors 
in securitization transactions may over-rely on rating-agency ratings. The 
extent of appropriate reliance on ratings, and indeed the integrity of the 
ratings process itself, are questions beyond the scope of today’s talk—
although I’m happy to discuss these questions during the Q&A at the end of 
the talk. 
 
My talk uses the following terminology:  
Subprime mortgage loans (also called subprime mortgages) are loans 
made to risky borrowers who use the proceeds to purchase homes and then 
mortgage the homes as collateral; because the borrowers are risky, the 
collateral is the primary source of repayment.  
In the most basic form of mortgage securitization, mortgage-backed 
securities (“MBS”) are issued by a special-purpose vehicle (“SPV”), and 
payment on the securities is derived directly from collections on mortgage 
loans owned by the SPV.  
More complex forms of mortgage-backed securities include 
collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) securities in which payment derives 
directly from a mixed pool of mortgage loans and sometimes, also, other 
financial assets owned by the SPV; and ABS CDO securities in which 
payment derives from MBS and CDO securities owned by the SPV (and 
thus indirectly from the mortgage loans and other financial assets underlying 
those owned securities).  
Subprime mortgage securitization can reference any of these financial 
products, so long as all or a material portion of the underlying financial 
assets consist of subprime mortgages.    
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WHAT WENT WRONG, AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE FIXED? 
 
 A. Problematic Asset Type.   
The failure of subprime mortgage securitization was caused by its 
almost absolute dependence on home appreciation. Some believe this type of 
particular sensitivity to declines in house prices was unique. From that 
perspective, parties structuring securitization transactions can minimize 
future problems by excluding, or at least limiting and better managing, 
subprime mortgage loans as an eligible type of underlying financial asset, 
and also by conservatively assessing the payment prognosis for other types 
of financial assets underlying securitizations. This is important not only to 
protect the integrity of securitization transactions but also to avoid the 
unintended consequence that securitization of a problematic asset type can 
motivate greater origination of that asset type. 
 
This is not to say these procedures will be failsafe. Parties to (and 
investors in) securitization transactions must always be diligent to recognize 
and try to protect against the possibility that the underlying financial assets 
might, as in the case of subprime mortgage loans, fail in unexpected ways. 
What would happen to automobile loan securitization, for example, if a 
technological innovation makes cars obsolete, depriving even financially 
healthy borrowers of the incentive to repay their loans? The invention of a 
new form of personal transportation is at least as plausible as the idea that 
home prices—which generally had only risen since the 1930s—would 
suddenly collapse in value at a rate higher than that seen during the Great 
Depression (as happened in the recent financial crisis). 
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The financial crisis also teaches us the danger of mixing politics and 
finance. Before that crisis, there was political pressure to securitize risky 
subprime mortgage loans to facilitate financing for the poor. We are likely to 
see the same type of political pressure to securitize risky microfinance loans 
to facilitate financing for the poor and disadvantaged, which I later discuss. 
 
B. Originate-to-Distribute Moral Hazard.   
Some argue that securitization facilitated an undisciplined mortgage 
lending industry. By enabling mortgage lenders to sell off loans as they were 
made (a concept called “originate-to-distribute”), securitization is said to 
have created moral hazard since these lenders did not have to live with the 
credit consequences of their loans. Mortgage underwriting standards 
therefore fell, exacerbated by the fact that mortgage lenders could make 
money on the volume of loans originated. 
 
  I find the moral hazard argument weak. Mortgage underwriting 
standards may have fallen, but there are other explanations of why. For 
example, lower standards may well reflect distortions caused by the liquidity 
glut of that time, in which lenders competed aggressively for business, 
allowed otherwise defaulting home borrowers to refinance, and (in the 
corporate lending context) even made so-called ‘covenant-lite’ loans. The 
fall in standards may also reflect conflicts of interest between lending-firms 
and their employees in charge of setting those standards, such as where 
employees were paid for booking loans regardless of the loans’ long-term 
performance.  
 
  Blaming the originate-to-distribute model for lower mortgage 
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underwriting standards also does not explain why standards were not 
similarly lowered for originating non-mortgage financial assets used in other 
types of securitization transactions. Nor does it explain why the ultimate 
beneficial owners of the mortgage loans—the investors in the mortgage-
backed securities—did not govern their investments by the same strict 
lending standards that they would observe but for the separation of 
origination and ownership (although I observed in yesterday’s lecture that 
this failure may at least partly be explained by (i) the inherent inadequacy of 
disclosure for the most complex (ABS CDO) mortgage-backed securities; 
(ii) the possibly excessive diversification of risk created by these securities, 
undermining any given investor’s incentive to monitor; and (iii) the 
tendency of investors to engage in herd behavior). 
 
  Although I don’t believe the originate-to-distribute model was a 
significant cause of the financial crisis, the model may need fixing to avoid 
its perception as the cause. There is little question, though, that the model 
should remain basically intact; it is critical to the underlying funding 
liquidity of banks and corporations, and empirical evidence tentatively 
indicates that it creates net value. The goal therefore should be to minimize 
any potential moral hazard resulting from the originate-to-distribute model 
without undermining the model’s basic utility. 
 
  There are various ways this might be done. Potential moral hazard 
problems could be managed, for example, by requiring mortgage lenders and 
other originators to retain some realistic risk of loss. This is the central 
approach of the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S., although we have already 
discussed in these lectures how this can lead to a ‘mutual misinformation’ 
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problem.  
 
  Moral hazard problems also could be managed by regulating loan 
underwriting standards. The United States took this type of approach, for 
example, in response to the margin-loan underwriting failures that helped 
trigger the Great Depression. When stock values began depreciating in 1929, 
margin loans (that is, loans to purchase publicly-listed stock) became 
undercollateralized, resulting in a high loan default rate which, in turn, 
caused bank lenders to fail. To protect against a recurrence of this problem, 
the Federal Reserve promulgated margin regulations G, U, T, and X, 
requiring margin lenders to maintain minimum two-to-one collateral 
coverage.  
 
   A similar type of approach applied to home-mortgage loans would 
certainly protect against a repeat of the recent crisis. That protection would 
come at a high price, though, potentially impeding and increasing the cost of 
home ownership and imposing an administrative burden on lenders and 
government monitors.  
 
 C. Servicing Conflicts.   
Mortgage securitization made it difficult to work out problems with 
the underlying mortgage loans because the beneficial owners of the loans are 
no longer the mortgage lenders but a broad universe of investors in the 
mortgage-backed securities. Servicers theoretically bridge the gap between 
investors (as beneficial owners of the loans) and the mortgage lenders, 
retaining the power to restructure the underlying loans “in the best interests” 
of those investors; but the reality is problematic.  
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Servicers may be reluctant to engage in a restructuring, for example, if 
there is uncertainty whether their costs will be reimbursed; whereas 
foreclosure costs are relatively minimal. Servicers may also prefer 
foreclosure over restructuring because foreclosure is more ministerial and 
thus has lower litigation risk. Restructuring can involve difficult decisions. 
For example, in a mortgage securitization transaction in which cash flows 
deriving from principal and interest are separately allocated to different 
investor classes, or ‘tranches,’ a restructuring that reduces the interest rate 
would adversely affect investors in the interest-only tranche (and likewise, a 
restructuring that reduces principal would adversely affect investors in the 
principal-only tranche). This leads to what some have called “tranche 
warfare”—a bad pun on Armistice Day! 
 
 These problems can, and in the future should, be fixed. Parties should 
write underlying deal documentation that sets clearer and more flexible 
guidelines and more certain reimbursement procedures for loan 
restructuring, especially when restructuring appears to be superior to 
foreclosure. Parties also should try to minimize allocating cash flows to 
investors in ways that create conflicts. Furthermore, I have argued that non-
conflicted servicers that engage in restructuring in good faith should be 
protected, perhaps akin to the type of protection afforded corporate directors 
under a business judgment rule.  
 
 D. Overreliance on Mathematical Models.   
To some extent the financial crisis resulted from an abandonment of 
common sense and an overreliance on complex mathematical models. 
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Models are essential to securitization because of the need to statistically 
predict what future cash flows will become available from the underlying 
financial assets to pay the mortgage-backed securities.2  
 
Models can bring insight and clarity. If the model is realistic and the 
inputted data are reliable, models can yield accurate predictions of real 
events. However, if the model is unrealistic or the inputted data are 
unreliable, models can be misleading—creating the danger of “garbage in, 
garbage out.” 
 
Subprime mortgage securitization models relied on assumptions and 
historical data which, in retrospect, turned out to be incorrect and therefore 
made the valuations incorrect. We discussed yesterday the limitations of the 
value-at-risk (VaR) model. The securitization models also incorrectly 
assumed that housing would not depreciate in value to the levels later seen. 
Valuation errors were compounded to the extent mortgage loans increasingly 
were made with innovative terms, such as adjustable rates, low-to-zero down 
payment requirements, interest-only payment options, and negative 
amortization. These terms were so complex that some borrowers did not 
fully understand the risks they were incurring. As a result, they defaulted at a 
much higher rate than would be predicted by the historical mortgage-loan 
default rates relied on by loan originators in extending credit. 
 
Securitization models also have been used, sometimes erroneously, to 
substitute for real market information. For example, some highly-leveraged 
                                                 
2 My use of the term ‘mortgage-backed securities’ is meant to be illustrative, not 
exclusive; securitization embraces securities backed by any form of financial assets. 
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ABS CDO securities did not have an active trading market, so investors 
instead relied on mark-to-model valuation of these securities. When 
assumptions underlying the models turned out to be wrong, investors 
panicked because they did not know what the securities were worth. 
 
In theory, this overreliance on mathematical models is self-correcting 
because the recent crisis, by its very existence, has shaken faith in the 
market’s ability to analyze and measure risk through models. Securitization 
products are likely to be confined, at least in the near future, to those that can 
be robustly modeled. The only question will be the longevity of the lesson 
that future risks cannot always be predicted through mathematical models. 
 
PART III 
THE FUTURE OF SECURITIZATION 
 
A. General Observations. 
Because securitization, properly utilized, is an efficient financial tool, 
its future should be assured no matter how investors or politicians might 
temporarily overreact. Nonetheless, in the near future at least, it is likely that 
securitization transactions will need to refocus on basic structures and asset 
types in order to attract investors.  
 
To this end, there likely will (and, I believe, should) be an emphasis 
on cash-flow securitizations in which there are the traditional “two-ways 
out.” An example of this would be the securitization of prime mortgages, in 
which payment can come from the borrower or the collateral. 
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Furthermore, we are not likely to see many highly complex 
securitization products, like ABS CDO transactions, which magnify 
leverage.  
 
But there are exciting potential new applications of securitization, 
such as to microfinance. Microfinance refers to providing small loans and 
other proportionally sized financial services to low-income individuals and 
the poor, in order to enable them to start or expand small businesses. 
Microfinance loans are now being made domestically and around the world, 
with estimates of between $20 and $60 billion outstanding. As a result of 
microfinance’s success, the need for microfinance lending vastly exceeds the 
amount of funds that can be raised from charitable donors. It has been 
estimated, for example, that of the one-and-a-half billion people potentially 
eligible for microfinance loans, only a hundred million people—less than 
seven percent—receive them. 
 
To satisfy this demand, commercial banks have become vital funding 
sources for microfinance loans in many countries. But many of these banks 
are charging exorbitant rates of interest, with some charging interest rates of 
100 percent or more.  
 
I have recently argued that securitization can, and indeed should, be 
applied to microfinance to disintermediate the need for commercial banks. 
Even profit motivated investors should want to invest in microfinance 
lending as a means of diversifying their portfolios, thereby protecting 
themselves from market risk. The challenge, though, is to ensure that 
microfinance securitization transactions are structured with the lessons of the 
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failure of subprime mortgage securitization in mind,3 and to resist political 
pressures to cut corners.  
 
 In the medium term, securitization’s future will be at least marginally 
influenced by the extent to which the intrinsic values of mortgage-backed 
securities turn out to be worth more than their market values. I have argued 
that, as a result of irrational panic, the market prices of mortgage-backed 
securities originally collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value of the 
mortgage loans underlying those securities. A large differential would 
indicate that the problem was more investor panic than intrinsic lack of 
worth; although the subsequent collapse of the real economy to some extent 
has made the price collapse a self-fulfilling prophecy by causing even prime 
borrowers to lose their jobs and default. 
 
 Whether securitization will remain vibrant and inventive in the long 
term, however, will turn on our ability to better understand the problems of 
complexity, which was at the root of many of the failures that gave rise to 
the financial crisis. Complexity was the subject of yesterday’s Leverhulme 
Lecture.  
 
B. Alternatives to Securitization. 
Covered bonds, which have a long history in European securities 
markets, are being widely touted as an alternative to securitization. By the 
                                                 
3 See Disintermediating Avarice: A Legal Framework for Commercially Sustainable 
Microfinance, forthcoming 2011 U. ILLINOIS L. REV., issue 4, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612766 (discussing ‘Risk of Loss’ in Part III.F thereof).  
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end of 2008, the amount of covered bonds outstanding in Europe alone was 
approximately 2.38 trillion euros, up from 1.5 trillion euros in 2003. 
 
There is no formal international convention or treaty defining covered 
bonds. They are instead defined, de facto, by their characteristics. 
Essentially they are long-term debt securities that are secured by specific 
assets of the issuer of the bonds. The assets so constituting collateral are 
called “cover-pool” assets. To the extent the cover-pool assets are 
insufficient to repay principal and interest on the covered bonds, investors in 
the bonds have an unsecured claim against the issuer for the insufficiency 
(‘dual recourse’).  
 
As with any granting of collateral, the cover-pool assets are deemed to 
remain on the issuer’s balance sheet (i.e., they remain owned by the issuer) 
for accounting purposes. Unlike normal collateral, however, these assets are 
“ring-fenced”—effectively segregated from the issuer’s estate—to give 
covered bondholders greater protection in the event of the issuer’s 
bankruptcy. Additionally, weak cover-pool assets are required to be replaced 
by good-quality assets throughout the life of the covered bonds, thereby 
maintaining a requisite level of “overcollateralization”—a surplus of 
collateral value over indebtedness.  
 
To ensure this is all enforceable by covered bondholders against other 
creditors of the issuer, some countries have promulgated specific covered 
bond legislation (a “legislative” covered bond regime). Absent such 
legislation, covered bondholders must rely on contractual protections and 
related commercial law (a “structured” covered bond regime).  
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Covered bond and securitization transactions have significant 
similarities. The most important is that both strive for bankruptcy 
remoteness—the goal of protecting covered bond investors in the event of 
the issuer’s bankruptcy. Covered bond transactions strive to achieve 
bankruptcy remoteness through ring-fencing or by legislative fiat. 
Securitization transactions achieve bankruptcy remoteness by having the 
company originating the receivables (the “originator”) transfer those 
receivables, in a “true sale” under bankruptcy law, to a bankruptcy-remote 
SPV—steps that can parallel ring-fencing.  
 
Another important similarity is that after covered bondholders are 
paid in full, and also after securitization investors are paid in full, any 
residual value from the transferred assets is returned for the benefit of other 
creditors. 
 
There are, however, several differences between covered bonds and 
securitization. A primary distinction is that covered bonds have dual 
recourse, whereas securitization constitutes non-recourse financing. Another 
distinction is that, in covered bond transactions, the cover-pool assets 
typically remain on the issuer’s balance sheet for accounting purposes 
whereas, in securitization transactions, it has been more typical for the 
transfer of assets from the originator to the SPV to be accounted for as a 
sale.  
 
This accounting distinction is somewhat artificial, however. 
Securitization transactions can be—and increasingly are—structured as on-
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balance-sheet transactions. The absence of an accounting benefit does not 
undermine securitization’s key fundraising and risk-transfer functions. The 
dual recourse distinction, however, is more critical. 
 
 Securitization, much like a new-money loan, would not harm 
unsecured creditors of a company to the extent it entails the exchange of one 
type of asset (e.g. mortgage loans, automotive loans, or other financial 
assets) for another asset, cash. But unsecured creditors can fare differently 
when a company issues covered bonds. Covered bonds are roughly 
equivalent to a securitization in their neutral immediate impact—unsecured 
creditors would only be harmed to the extent a covered bond issue increases 
the issuer’s chance of bankruptcy or there is overinvestment of the proceeds 
of the bond issue. Covered bonds, however, go beyond securitization in two 
ways that can harm unsecured creditors.  
 
 In a securitization, if the overcollateralization is insufficient to repay 
investors, the investors suffer a loss because they only have recourse to 
assets that the SPV has already purchased. The pool of assets available for 
repayment is, in other words, effectively fixed or static. In contrast, in 
covered bond transactions, the cover pools are usually dynamic, requiring 
the covered bond issuer to continually segregate new assets as needed to 
maintain overcollateralization—thereby enabling the covered bonds to 
continue to be paid in priority to unsecured claims.   
 
Covered bonds also go beyond securitization in their recourse. 
Whereas securitization transactions are non-recourse, covered bonds have 
dual recourse. If, therefore, the cover-pool assets are insufficient, covered 
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bondholders have a recourse claim against the issuer. That claim, being pari 
passu with unsecured creditor claims, would further dilute unsecured 
creditor recovery.  
 
As a result of the dynamic cover pool and dual recourse, covered bond 
transactions thus shift virtually all risk to unsecured creditors. The extent to 
which risk should be allocated so asymmetrically is an important policy 
question that should be addressed by any governments and market 
participants exploring covered bonds as an alternative to securitization.  
 
